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Abstract
Decentralized optimization techniques are increasingly being used to learn machine learning models
from data distributed over multiple locations without gathering the data at any one location. Unfortu-
nately, methods that are designed for faultless networks typically fail in the presence of node failures. In
particular, Byzantine failures—corresponding to the scenario in which faulty/compromised nodes are al-
lowed to arbitrarily deviate from an agreed-upon protocol—are the hardest to safeguard against in decen-
tralized settings. This paper introduces a Byzantine-resilient decentralized gradient descent (BRIDGE)
method for decentralized learning that, when compared to existing works, is more efficient and scalable
in higher-dimensional settings and that is deployable in networks having topologies that go beyond the
star topology. The main contributions of this work include theoretical analysis of BRIDGE for strongly
convex learning objectives and numerical experiments demonstrating the efficacy of BRIDGE for both
convex and nonconvex learning tasks.
1 Introduction
Learning a model that minimizes the statistical risk is one of the fundamental goals of machine learning.
A typical technique that accomplishes this task is empirical risk minimization (ERM) [1–4]. In this case,
the model is learned by applying optimization tools on a training dataset that is traditionally assumed to
be available at a centralized location. However, in many recent applications (e.g., the Internet of Things),
training data are distributed over a network, while in some other applications, the dataset cannot be processed
by a single machine due to its size (e.g., social network data) or privacy concerns (e.g., smartphone data).
Such applications require that the model be learned over the network. When the learning alrogorithm requires
a central server directly connected to all the nodes in the network, we term the algorithm as distributed
learning. Some other algorithms can accomplish learning tasks without a central server. We call these
algirhtms decentralized learning algorithms.
While learning over a network has a rich history in the literature, a significant fraction of that work
has focused on faultless networks [5, 6]. On the other hand, real-world networks are bound to undergo
failures because of malfunctioning equipment, cyber attacks, etc. [7, 8]. And when failures happen, learning
algorithms designed for faultless networks completely break down. Among different types of failures in
the network, a Byzantine failure is considered the most general as it allows the faulty/compromised node
to arbitrarily deviate from the agreed-upon protocol [9]. Byzantine failures are the hardest to safeguard
against and can easily jeopardize the operation of the entire network [10–12]. In [13], for example, it has
been shown that a single Byzantine node in the network can lead to the failure of decentralized learning
algorithms with a simple strategy. The overarching goal of this paper is to develop an efficient decentralized
learning algorithm that is provably resilient against Byzantine failures in decentralized settings.
∗This work is supported in part by the NSF under awards CCF-1453073 and CCF-CCF-1907658, by the ARO under award
W911NF-17-1-0546, and by the DARPA Lagrange Program under ONR/SPAWAR contract N660011824020.
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1.1 Related works
The machine learning task can be accomplished by defining and then minimizing a (regularized) loss function
on the training data over a network. There have been several types of decentralized optimization methods
that can solve the resulting problem. One class of the most commonly used methods is gradient-based
such as distributed gradient descent (DGD) [14–16]; methods in this class have low local computational
complexity. Augmented Lagrangian-based methods are also broadly adopted for decentralized optimization
[17–19], which require each node to solve an optimization subproblem locally. A third type of decentralized
optimization methods includes second-order methods [20,21], which usually have high computational and/or
communications cost. Although any of the algorithms mentioned above can be applied to solve decentralized
learning problems, these algorithms have been developed under the assumption that there are no failures in
the network.
1.2 Our contributions
This paper focuses on solving a decentralized vector-valued learning problem under Byzantine settings.
Comparing to recent works on Byzantine-resilient distributed learning algorithms [13, 22–35], there are two
aspects of contribution in this paper. The first aspect is that we combine dimension-wise trimmed mean
with decentralized gradient descent in this work. While a similar idea has been studied for distributed
setting [27, 28], the consensus and convergence behavior of applying trimmed mean on gradient descent in
decentralized setting was completely unknown before this paper. As we show later in the paper, the analysis
is very different from the distributed setting and the guarantees are also different. The main reason is that
decentralized learning algorithm requires consensus which usually is not required for distributed setting.
As a result, Byzantine failures are much more dangerous and harder to deal with in decentralized settings.
It is shown in previous works [13] that one Byzantine node with simple strategies is enough to crash the
whole network, while it usually takes a portion of nodes to undergo failures or some extremely large value in
distributed settings to show the performance difference. In the decentralized setting, a nonfaulty node cannot
distinguish Byzantine neighbors from nonfaulty neighbors due to the lack of knowledge about most of the
nodes in the network. So any given node has to engage with Byzantine nodes during consensus too. While
in the distributed setting, nodes can always trust the server. For this reason, translating Byzantine-resilient
algorithm under distributed settings to decentralized settings is highly nontrivial.
There do exist previous works that focus on Byzantine resilience in the decentralized setting [13, 22–
26, 29]. But these works either do not trivially translate into a general learning problem [22–25, 36] or lack
generalization from scalar-valued problems to vector-valued ones [13, 37]. The coordinate descent-based
algorithm introduced in [38] is the only vector-valued decentralized Byzantine-resilient algorithm to the best
of our knowledge. But because the algorithm emphasizes one-coordinate-at-a-time process (cannot use block
coordinate to accelerate), the algorithm is not preferable when calculating one dimension gradient is not
cheap (e.g., deep neural networks). In this paper, we develop an efficient Byzantine-resilient algorithm and
show that the algorithm solves decentralized vector-valued learning problems under Byzantine settings. We
provide theoretical guarantees for strongly convex problems, while we show the usefulness of our algorithm
on nonconvex learning problems using numerical experiments.
1.3 Notations
All vectors are taken to be column vectors, while [a]k and [A]ij denote the k-th element of vector a and the
(i, j)-th element of matrix A, respectively. We use ‖a‖ to denote ℓ2-norm of a and 1 to denote the vector
of all ones, while (·)T denotes the transpose operation. Given a set, | · | denotes its cardinality. Finally, we
use ▽f(w, z) to denote the gradient of a function f(w, z) with respect to w. We use 〈a1, a2〉 to denote the
inner product. For a given vector a and constant γ, we denote the ℓ2-ball of radius γ centered around a as
B(a, γ) := {a′ : ‖a− a′‖ ≤ γ}.
2
2 Problem formulation
The goal of this paper is the following: when given a network in which each node has access to some local
training data, we want to learn a machine learning model in a decentralized fashion, even in the presence of
Byzantine failures. In this section, we first describe the basic problem with a mathematical model. Then we
introduce the Byzantine failure model.
2.1 Decentralized learning model
We consider a network of M nodes, expressed as a directed, static graph G(J , E). Here, the set J :=
{1, . . . ,M} represents nodes in the network, while the set of edges E represents communication links between
different nodes. Specifically, (j, i) ∈ E if and only if node i can receive information from node j and vice
versa. Each node j has access only to a local training set Zj = {zjn}|Zj|n=1. Training samples z belong to some
Hilbert space are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and drawn from an unknown distribution
P , i.e., zjn ∼ P . For simplicity, we assume that the cardinalities of local training sets are the same, i.e.,
|Zj | = N . The generalization to the case when Zj ’s are not equal sized is trivial.
Machine learning tasks are usually accomplished by defining and statistically minimizing a risk function
Ez∼P [f(w, z)] with respect to a variable w. For simplicity, we use E[f(w)] in the following to denote
the statistical risk function in this paper. We denote the true minimizer of the risk function as w∗, i.e.,
w∗ = argmin
w∈Rd
E[f(w)]. In learning problems, the distribution P is usually unknown. Therefore w∗ cannot
be solved for directly. One way of completing the task in the decentralized setting is to employ empirical
risk minimization (ERM), i.e.,
min
w∈Rd
1
MN
M∑
j=1
N∑
n=1
f(w, zjn)
△
= min
w∈Rd
1
M
M∑
j=1
fj(w). (1)
It can be shown that the minimizer of (1) converges to w∗ with high probability as MN increases [39]. In
this paper, we focus on finite valued strongly convex risk functions with Lipschitz gradient. Here we make
the assumptions formally.
Assumption 1 The risk function f(w, z) is bounded almost surely over all training samples, i.e., f(w, z) ≤
C <∞, ∀z ∈ ⋃
j∈J
Zj.
Assumption 2 The risk function f(w, z) is λ-strongly convex, i.e., satisfying f(w1, z) ≥ f(w2, z)+〈∇f(w2, z),w2−
w1〉+ λ2 ‖w1 −w2‖2 .
Assumption 3 The gradient of f(w, z) is L′-Lipschitz, i.e., satisfying ‖∇f(w1, z)−∇f(w2, z)‖ ≤ L′‖w1−
w2‖.
Note that Assumption 3 implies that the risk function itself is also Lipschitz, i.e., ‖f(w1, z) − f(w2, z)‖ ≤
L‖w1 −w2‖ for some L [40].
In decentralized learning, each node j maintains a local variable wj . Then the ERM problem can be
solved in the decentralized fashion, i.e.,
min
{w1,...,wM}
1
M
M∑
j=1
fj(wj) subject to wi = wj ∀i, j. (2)
To accomplish the decentralized ERM task, all nodes need to cooperate with each other by communicating
with their neighbors over edges. We define the neighborhood of node j as Nj := {i ∈ J : (i, j) ∈ E}. If
i ∈ Nj , then i is a neighbor of node j. Classic decentralized learning algorithms proceed iteratively. A node
is expected to accomplish two tasks during each iteration: update the local variable wj according to some
rule gj(·) and broadcast a message to all its neighbors. Note that node j can receive values from node i only
if i ∈ Nj .
3
2.2 Byzantine failure model
When there is no failure in the network, decentralized learning is well understood [19,41]. The main assump-
tion in this paper is that some of the nodes in the network can arbitrarily deviate from intended behavior.
We model this behavior as Byzantine failure, formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 A node j ∈ J is said to be Byzantine if during any iteration, it either updates its local
variable using an update function g˜j(·) 6= gj(·) or it broadcasts some value other than the intended update to
its neighbors.
We use J ′ to denote the set of nonfaulty nodes and we assume that there are at most b Byzantine nodes
in the network. We label the nonfaulty nodes from 1 to |J ′| without loss of generality. We now provide
some definitions and assumptions that are common in the literature, e.g., [13, 38].
Definition 2 A subgraph Gr of G is called a reduced graph if it is generated from graph G by (i) removing
all Byzantine nodes along with all their incoming and outgoing edges, and (ii) removing additionally up to b
incoming edges from each nonfaulty node. A source component of graph Gr is a collection of nodes such that
each node in the source component has a directed path to every other node in Gr.
Assumption 4 All reduced graphs Gr generated from G(J , E) contain a source component of cardinality at
least b+ 1.
Assumption 4 describes the redundancy of a graph. What it ensures is that after removing a certain
number of edges from nonfaulty nodes, each normal node can still receive information from a few other
nonfaulty nodes. While checking this assumption efficiently remains an open problem, we do understand the
generation of graphs that satisfy this assumption. One way of generating a resilient graph was introduced
in the literature during the study of Byzantine-resilient consensus techniques, e.g., in [26]. We also have
observed empirically that in an Erdo¨s–Re´nyi graph, when the degree of the least connected node is larger
than 2b, the assumption is often satisfied. This is also the technique we use to generate graphs in our
numerical experiments. We also emphasize that we do not need to know the exact number of Byzantine
nodes. Constructing a graph with a chosen b will enable our algorithm to tolerate at most b Byzantine nodes
and the algorithm still has a competitive performance even if there is actually no failure in the network. In the
next section, we will introduce a Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm for distributed learning and theoretically
analyze it under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. The algorithm is expected to accomplish the following tasks:
(i) achieve consensus, i.e., wj = wi ∀i, j ∈ J ′ as the number of iterations t→∞; and (ii) learn a wj → w∗
∀j ∈ J ′ as sample size N →∞.
3 Byzantine-resilient distributed gradient descent
It is shown in [42] that the exact global optimal of (2) is not achievable when b ≥ 1. In this section, we
introduce an algorithm called Byzantine-resilient decentralized gradient descent (BRIDGE) that pursues the
minimum of the statistical risk in the presence of Byzantine failures given that the training data are i.i.d..
3.1 Algorithm
When the network is fault free. One way of of solving (2) is to let each node update its local variable
wj(t) as
wj(t+ 1) =
∑
i∈Nj∪{j}
ajwi(t)− ρ(t)∇fj(wj(t)), (3)
where aj is the weight and {ρ(t)} is a positive sequence satisfying ρ(t + 1) ≤ ρ(t),
∞∑
t=0
ρ(t) → ∞ and
∞∑
t=0
ρ(t)2 <∞. One way of choosing ρ(t) is to use the O(1/t) sequence as the following. Find a t0 > L/λ and
set ρ(t) = 1/λ(t0+ t) so that ρ(0) < 1/L and ρ(t) is O(1/t). Note that (3) is a special case of the distributed
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Algorithm 1 Byzantine-resilient decentralized gradient descent (BRIDGE)
Input: b ∈ N, Zj , and {ρ(t)}∞t=1 at node j ∈ J ′
1: t← 0, wj(0)← 0
2: for t = 0, 1, 2, ... do
3: Broadcast wj(t)
4: Receive wi(t) from i ∈ Nj
5: for k = 1, 2, 3, ..., d do
6: N k′j (t)← argmin
X:{X∈Nj,|X|=b}
∑
i∈X
[wi(t)]k
7: N k′′j (t)← argmax
X:{X∈Nj ,|X|=b}
∑
i∈X
[wi(t)]k
8: N kj (t)← Nj \ N k
′
j (t) \ N k
′′
j (t)
9: [wj(t+ 1)]k ← 1|Nj |−2b+1
∑
i∈Nk
j
(t)∪j
[wi(t)]k − ρ(t)[▽fj(wj(t))]k
10: end for
11: end for
Output: wj(t)
gradient descent (DGD) algorithm [14]. The main difference between the proposed algorithm and the classic
DGD method is that there is a screening step before each update, which is the key idea to make BRIDGE
Byzantine resilient. The complete process at each node j ∈ J ′ is as shown in Algorithm 1.
When initializing the algorithm, it is necessary to specify b, the maximum number of Byzantine nodes
that the algorithm can tolerate. Each node j ∈ J ′ initializes at wj(0) = 0 or some arbitrary vector. During
each iteration t, node j first broadcasts wj(t) and then receives wi(t) from all i ∈ Nj . Next, node j performs
a screening among all wi(t)’s. The screening is with respect to each dimension separately. At dimension k,
node j separates Nj into three groups defined as following:
N k′j (t) = argmin
X:{X∈Nj ,|X|=b}
∑
i∈X
[wi(t)]k, (4)
N k′′j (t) = argmax
X:{X∈Nj ,|X|=b}
∑
i∈X
[wi(t)]k, (5)
and
N kj (t) = Nj \ N k
′
j (t) \ N k
′′
j (t). (6)
Then node j updates the k-th element of wj as
[wj(t+ 1)]k =
1
|Nj | − 2b+ 1
∑
i∈Nk
j
(t)∪{j}
[wi(t)]k − ρ(t)[∇fj(wj(t))]k. (7)
The idea of performing screening before updating is to eliminate the largest and the smallest b values in
each dimension. This screening method is called coordinate-wise trimmed mean. The screening can be
easily realized by a simple sorting process. Since the update of the k-th element does not depend on other
coordinates of {wi(t)} or ∇fj(wj(t)), the update of each dimension (step 5 to 10) can be done in parallel
or sequentially in any order. Note that N kj (t) is likely to be different for different k at each iteration so
that only some elements of wi(t) for any i may be taken for update at node j while other elements are
dropped. But the size of each N kj (t) is the same in all dimensions. We now give theoretical guarantees for
this algorithm.
Theorem 1 If Assumption 1, 2, 3, and 4 are satisfied, BRIDGE can achieve consensus on all nonfaulty
nodes, i.e., wj(t) = wi(t) ∀i, j ∈ J ′, as t → ∞. Further, as N → ∞, the output of BRIDGE converges
sublinearly in t to the minimum of the global statistical risk at each nonfaulty node, i.e., wj(t) → w∗,
∀i, j ∈ J ′, with probability going to 1.
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The theorem shows that the BRIDGE algorithm can learn a good model even when there are Byzantine
failures in the network. To achieve this goal, the algorithm needs to accomplish two tasks: consensus and
optimality. Consensus requires that all nonfaulty nodes agree on the same variable (wi = wj) despite the
existence of Byzantine failures in the network while optimality requires that the globally agreed model indeed
minimizes the statistical risk (wj → w∗). In the next section, we will prove the theorem for consensus and
optimality, respectively.
4 Theoretical analysis
While gradient descent is well understood in the literature, we observe that BRIDGE does not take a regular
gradient step at each iteration. The main idea of proving Theorem 1 is to take advantage of the convergence
property of gradient descent and try to bound the distance between one gradient descent step and one
BRIDGE step. The proof can be briefly described as the following. The BRIDGE local update sequence is
described in (7). We first define a vector sequence v(t) and show that wj(t)→ v(t) as t→∞, which is the
proof for consensus. We then consider three sequences x(t), u(t), and v(t) that will be defined later. We
define the following distances: ‖x(t+ 1)−w∗‖ = a1, ‖u(t+ 1)− x(t+ 1)‖ = a2, ‖v(t+ 1)− u(t+ 1)‖ = a3,
and ‖wj(t+1)− v(t+1)‖ = a4. Observe that ‖wj(t+ 1)−w∗‖ ≤ a1 + a2 + a3 + a4, we then show that a1,
a2, a3 and a4 all go to 0. This is the proof for optimality.
4.1 Consensus analysis
Recall that the update is done in parallel for all coordinates. So we pick one coordinate k and prove that all
nodes achieve consensus in this coordinate. Since k is arbitrarily picked, we then conclude that consensus is
achieved for all coordinates. In this section, we drop the index k for all variables for simplicity. It should be
straight forward that the variables are k-dependent.
Define a vector Ω(t) ∈ R|J ′| whose elements are the k-th elements of wj(t) from nonfaulty nodes only,
i.e., [Ω(t)]j = [wj(t)]k ∀j ∈ J ′. We first show that the update can be written in a matrix form which only
involves nonfaulty nodes, i.e.,
Ω(t+ 1) = Y(t)Ω(t)− ρ(t)g(t), (8)
where g(t) is formed as [g(t)]j = [∇fj(wj(t))]k. The formulation of matrix Y(t) can be described as
following. Let N ′j denote the nonfaulty nodes in the neighborhood of node j, i.e., N ′j = J ′ ∩Nj . The set of
Byzantine neighbors can be defined as N bj = Nj \ N ′j . One of two cases can happen during each iteration,
(i) N kj (t) ∩ N bj 6= ∅ or (ii) N kj (t) ∩ N bj = ∅. To make the expression clear, we drop the iteration indicator t
for the rest of this discussion. It should be straightforward that the variables are t-dependent. For case (i),
since |N bj | ≤ b and |N k
′
j | = b, we know that N k
′
j ∩N ′j 6= ∅. Similarly, N k
′′
j ∩N ′j 6= ∅. Then ∃m′j ∈ N k
′
j ∩N ′j
and m′′j ∈ N k
′′
j ∩ N ′j satisfying [wm′j ]k < [wi]k < [wm′′j ]k for any i ∈ N kj . So that for each i ∈ N kj ∩ N bj ,
∃θi ∈ (0, 1) satisfying [wi]k = θi[wm′
j
]k + (1 − θi)[wm′′
j
]k. In this way, we can express the update with only
messages from nonfaulty nodes. The elements of matrix Y can be written as
[Y]ji =

1
|Nj |−2b+1 , i ∈ N ′ ∩N kj ,
1
|Nj |−2b+1 , i = j,∑
i′∈N b∩Nk
j
θi′
|Nj |−2b+1 , i = m
′
j ,∑
i′∈N b∩Nk
j
1−θi′
|Nj |−2b+1, i = m
′′
j ,
0, else.
(9)
For case (ii), since all nodes in N kj are already nonfaulty, we keep only the first, second and last rows of
(9). Note that since the choices of m′j and m
′′
j are generally not unique, the formulation of matrix Y is
also not unique. So far, we have expressed the update of nonfaulty nodes within matrix form involving only
nonfaulty nodes.
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Next, define a transition matrix to represent the product of Y(t),
Φ(t, t0) = Y(t)Y(t − 1)...Y(t0). (10)
Let ψ be the total number of reduced graphs we can generate from G. Let ν = ψ|J ′|. Denote max
j∈J ′
|Nj | by
Nmax. Let µ = 1− 1(2Nmax−2b+1)ν . Then it is know from previous work [42, 43] that
[Φ(t, t0)]ji − [α(t0)]i ≤ µ(
t−t0+1
ν
), (11)
where α(t0) satisfies [α(t0)]j ≥ 0 and
|J ′|∑
j=1
[α(t0)]j = 1. It can also be expressed as
lim
t→∞Φ(t, t0) = 1α
T (t0). (12)
Taking t = 0 as the starting point, we can express the iterations as
Ω(1) = Y(0)Ω(0)− ρ(0)g(0)
Ω(2) = Y(1)Ω(1)− ρ(1)g(1)
= Y(1)Y(0)Ω(0)−Y(1)ρ(0)g(0) − ρ(1)g(1)
. . .
Ω(t) = Y(t− 1)Ω(t− 1)− ρ(t− 1)g(t− 1)
= Y(t− 1)Y(t− 2) · · ·Y(0)Ω(0)−
t−1∑
τ=0
Y(t− 1)Y(t − 2) . . .Y(τ + 1)ρ(τ)g(τ)
= Φ(t, 0)Ω(0)−
t−1∑
τ=0
Φ(t− 1, τ + 1)ρ(τ)g(τ). (13)
Let us create a scenario that all nodes stop computing local gradients after iteration t so that g(τ) = 0 when
τ > t. Define a vector v¯(t) under this scenario, i.e.,
v¯(t) = lim
T→∞
Ω(t+ T + 1)
= lim
T→∞
Φ(t+ T, 0)Ω(0)− lim
T→∞
t+T∑
τ=0
Φ(t+ T, τ)ρ(τ)g(τ)
= 1αT (0)Ω(0)−
t+T∑
τ=0
1αT (τ)ρ(τ)g(τ)
= 1αT (0)Ω(0)−
t−1∑
τ=0
1αT (τ)ρ(τ)g(τ). (14)
Observe that v¯ has identical elements in all dimensions. Let scalar sequence v(t) denote one element of v¯.
Next, we show that [wj(t)]k → v(t) as t→∞. From (14),
v(t) =
|J ′|∑
i=1
[α(0)]i[wi(0)]k −
t−1∑
τ=0
ρ(τ)
|J ′|∑
i=1
[α(τ)]i[∇fi(wi(τ))]k (15)
Then recall from the update of [wj(t)]k that
[wj(t)]k =
|J ′|∑
i=1
[Φ(t− 1, 0)]ji[wi(0)]k −
t−1∑
τ=0
ρ(τ)
|J ′|∑
i=1
[Φ(t− 1, τ)]ji[∇fi(wi(τ))]k (16)
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If Assumption 3 hold and we initiate the algorithm from some vector with finite norm, we can always find
two scalars Cw and L satisfying that ∀j ∈ J ′, |[wj(0)]k| ≤ Cw and |[∇fj(wj)]k| ≤ L. Then we have
|[wj(t)]k − v(t)| ≤ |
|J ′|∑
i=1
([Φ(t− 1, 0)]ji − [α(0)]i)[wi(0)]k|+
|
t−1∑
τ=0
ρ(τ)
|J ′|∑
i=1
([Φk(t− 1, τ)]ji − [α(τ)]i)[∇fi(wi(τ))]k |
≤ |J ′|Cwµ tν + |J ′|L
t∑
τ=0
ρ(τ)µ
t−τ+1
ν → 0 (17)
as t → 0. Since k is arbitrarily picked, the convergence is true for all dimensions. Define a vector v(t)
satisfying [v(t)]k = v(t) for 1 ≤ k ≤ d. Then as t→∞,
a4 = ‖wj(t)− v(t)‖ ≤
√
d|J ′|Cwµ tν +
√
d|J ′|L
t∑
τ=0
ρ(τ)µ
t−τ+1
ν → 0. (18)
The convergence in (18) can also be interpreted as wj(t) → v(t) as t → ∞. The proof of consensus is
complete.
Remark 1 It follows from (18) that the rate of consensus convergence is O(√dρ(t)). Specifically, if choosing
ρ(t) to be O(1/t) gives us ‖wj(t)− v(t)‖ = O(
√
d/t).
4.2 Optimality analysis
From (18), we have an upper bound for d4. We then bound the other distances to show wj(t)→ w∗. Note
that the sequenceW(t) is not truly kept at any node, so we first describe the “update” ofW(t). Considering
(14) for all coordinates together, the update for the full vector can be written in the form
v(t+ 1) = v(t)− ρ(t)g1(t) (19)
where g1(t) satisfies [g1(t)]k =
|J ′|∑
i=1
[αk(t)]i[∇fi(wi)]k for 1 ≤ k ≤ P . Define another vector g2(t) satisfying
[g2(t)]k =
|J ′|∑
i=1
[αk(t)]i[∇fi(v(t))]k . We define a new sequence u(t+ 1) as
u(t+ 1) = v(t)− ρ(t)g2(t). (20)
Recalling that
a3 = ‖v(t+ 1)− u(t+ 1)‖ = ‖g2(t)− g1(t)‖, (21)
from (17) and Assumption 3 we have
a3 ≤
√
P |J ′|L′Cwµ tν +
√
P |J ′|LL′
t∑
τ=0
ρ(τ)µ
t−τ+1
ν . (22)
Next, defining a new sequence X(t) as
x(t+ 1) = v(t)− ρ(t)∇E[f(v(t))], (23)
we have
a2 = ‖u(t+ 1)− x(t+ 1)‖ = ‖g2(t)− E[∇f(v(t))]‖. (24)
Here we give a lemma to show the relationship between g2(t) and the gradient of the statistical risk.
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Lemma 1 If Assumption 1 and 3 are satisfied, with probability at least 1− δ,
a2 ≤ sup
t
|g2(v(t)) − E[∇f(v(t))]| = O
√‖α¯‖2 log 2δ
N
 (25)
where α¯ ∈ R|J ′| satisfies [α]j ≥ 0 and
|J ′|∑
j=1
[α]j = 1.
Lemma 1 shows that g2(t) converges to the gradient of statistical risk in probability. The proof of Lemma
1 is in the Appendix A.
Remark 2 Lemma 1 shows that the difference between the gradient step of v(t) and the true gradient step
is of order O
(√‖α¯‖2/N). If there is no failure in the network, the gradient step for non-resilient algorithm
such as DGD usually has an error rate O
(√
1/MN
)
. If each node runs centralized algorithm with the
given N samples, the error rate for gradient step is usually O
(√
1/N
)
. Science α¯ is a stochastic vector,
1/MN ≤ ‖α¯‖2/N ≤ 1/N . The lemma shows that BRIDGE improves the sample complexity by a factor of
‖α¯‖2 for each node by cooperating over a network.
Now we focus on a1 = ‖x(t + 1) − w∗‖. Note that x(t + 1) is obtained by v(t) taking a regular
gradient descent step of E[f(v(t))] with step size ρ(t). When Assumption 2 and 3 are satisfied, it is well
understood [44, Ch.9] that the gradient descent step satisfies
‖x(t+ 1)−w∗‖ ≤
√
1− λρ(t)‖v(t)− w∗‖. (26)
Then we have
a1(t+ 1) = ‖x(t+ 1)−w∗‖ ≤
√
1− λρ(t)‖v(t)− w∗‖ ≤ a4(t) +
√
1− λρ(t)‖wj(t)−w∗‖. (27)
Now we can write the property of sequence wj for some j ∈ J ′ as
‖wj(t+ 1)−w∗‖ ≤
√
1− λρ(t)‖wj(t)−w∗‖+ a2(t) + a3(t) + 2a4(t). (28)
It follows from (18), (22), and Lemma 1 that with probability at least δ,
‖wj(t+ 1)−w∗‖ ≤
√
1− λρ(t)‖wj(t)−w∗‖+O
(√
dρ(t)
)
+O
√‖α¯‖2 log 2δ
N
 . (29)
Remark 3 When choosing ρ(t) to be O(1/t), the second term on the right hand side of (29) is O(√d/t).
Note that the right hand side of (29) converges to 1 as t→ 0 and N → 0. Given that wj(t)→ w∗, inequality
(29) shows a sublinear convergence rate.
We have shown wj(t)
t→ v(t) in the consensus analysis. We then show that v(t) N,t→ w∗ in Appendix B. The
analysis of Theorem 1 is complete.
5 Numerical analysis
The numerical experiments are separated into two parts. In the first part, we run experiments on MNIST
dataset using linear classifier with squared hinge loss, which is a case that fully satisfies all our assumptions
for the theoretical guarantees and is broadly adopted in solving real-world machine learning problems. In the
second part, we run experiments on MNIST dataset with a convolutional neural network, which does not fully
satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1. The purpose is to address the usefulness of our Byzantine-resilient
technique on a more general (nonconvex) class of machine learning problems.
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Figure 1: Classification accuracy on MNIST dataset for different learning methods. When there is no
failure in the network, DGD does have the best performance in terms of both communication efficiency and
final accuracy, but DGD completely fails where there are Byzantine nodes in the network. ByRDiE and
BRIDGE have similar final accuracy under Byzantine settings and the accuracy gap to faultless DGD is
small, which indicates that both algorithms are indeed Byzantine resilient. The difference between ByRDiE
and BRIDGE is in the communication efficiency. Since BRIDGE updates the whole vector at each iteration,
fewer communication iterations are required to reach the best accuracy.
5.1 Linear classifier on MNIST
The first set of experiments is performed to demonstrate two facts: BRIDGE can maintain good performance
under Byzantine settings while classic distributed learning methods fail; and comparing with an existing
Byzantine-resilient method, ByRDiE [38], BRIDGE is more efficient in terms of communication cost. We
choose one of the most well-understood machine learning tools, the linear classifier with squared hinge loss,
to learn the model. Note that this method satisfies the assumption of strictly convex loss function with
Lipschitz gradient.
The MNIST dataset is a set of 60,000 training images and 10,000 test images of handwritten digits from
‘0’ to ‘9’. Each image is converted to a 784-dimensional vector and we distributed 60,000 images equally
onto 100 nodes. Then we connect each pair of nodes with probability 0.5. Ten of the nodes are randomly
picked to be Byzantine nodes which broadcast random vectors to all their neighbors during each iteration.
We check and make sure the network satisfies Assumption 4 with b = 10. The classifiers are trained using
the “one vs all” strategy. We run five sets of experiments: (i) classic distributed gradient descent (DGD)
with no Byzantine nodes; (ii) classic DGD with 10 Byzantine nodes; (iii) centralized gradient descent with
only local data; (iv)BRIDGE with 10 Byzantine nodes; and (v) ByRDiE with 10 Byzantine nodes. The
performance is evaluated by two metrics: classification accuracy on the 10,000 test images and whether
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Table 1: Linear classifier “one vs all” on MNIST dataset
Algorithm Failures Accuracy Consensus
DGD 0 89.8%
√
Local GD N/A 84.3% N/A
DGD 10 10.3% ×
ByRDiE 10 89.2%
√
BRIDGE 10 89.3%
√
consensus is achieved. When comparing ByRDiE and BRIDGE, we compare the accuracy with respect to
the number of communication iterations.
The result is shown in Table 1. When there are no failures in the network, the performance of DGD is
aligned with preliminary works [45]. However, in the presence of Byzantine failures, DGD fails in the sense
that it cannot either learn a good classifier or achieve consensus. There are two aspects worth considering
for BRIDGE algorithm. First is that the gap between the performance of BRIDGE under failure and DGD
under no failure is small but the gap between BRIDGE and local gradient descent is large. This shows the
necessity to have a robust distributed learning method: by cooperating with more nodes in the network,
one can achieve a better performance than using only local data. The second aspect is that comparing with
ByRDiE, BRIDGE has better communication efficiency. This is primarily because BRIDGE updates the
variables in all dimensions for each message exchange while ByRDiE only updates one dimension at a time.
5.2 Convolutional neural network on MNIST
In section 4, we have given theoretical guarantees under the assumption of strictly convex risk functions.
However, there is a wide class of modern machine learning problems that are nonconvex but have very
good performance (e.g., deep neural networks). In this set of experiments, we demonstrate the usefulness
of the screening technique in BRIDGE on a smaller scale but for a highly nonconvex problem: distributed
convolutional neural network. We create a network with 10 nodes and 500 training samples on each node.
Each local neural network is constructed by two convolution layers, each followed by a max pooling layer, and
two fully connected layers before output. The label of each sample is represented by the one-hot expression.
We randomly pick 1 node to be Byzantine node which broadcasts random values to its neighbors during
each iteration. The distribution of the random values is identical to the random initiation of each layer. The
way we generate the training sets and the network topology is identical to the previous test. We pick the
Adam optimizer [46] as the local update method. Adam is an extended version of stochastic gradient descent
and it is known to have better performance on the setting of these experiments. The algorithm proceeds
as following: each node takes a local Adam step with a batch size of 50 and then broadcasts the network
weights to its neighbor; after receiving the weights from neighbors, each node takes average of its neighbors’
weights (with BRIDGE screening if required); each node repeats the process for 1000 epochs. We run four
rounds of experiments and average each round over 100 independent trials: (i) Adam with no screening and
no failure; (ii) Adam with no screening under failure; (iii) BRIDGE (Adam with screening); and (iv) Adam
with only local data. The results are shown in Table 2.
The results show that Adam with no screening fails when there are failures in the network. The small
gap between BRIDGE performance and faultless Adam performance indicates that the Byzantine-resilient
technique can also be applied to nonconvex machine learning tools. The performance difference between
BRIDGE and training with only local data shows that BRIDGE can benefit from cooperation with other
nodes even when there are failures in the network. We emphasize here again that in the fully distributed
setting, one Byzantine node with a reasonable normed value is enough to bring down the whole network. In
contrast to the federated settings [33,34], it does not need a portion of nodes to be faulty or an extremely large
value (gradient with 100 times larger elements) to show an obvious performance difference. This is because
a Byzantine node can bias the normal nodes through consensus process, which is not a part of federated
setting algorithms. This shows that Byzantine failures are much more dangerous and harder to safeguard
against in fully distributed settings. Thus Byzantine-resilient algorithms in fully distributed settings are of
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Table 2: Convolutional neural network on MNIST dataset
Algorithm Failures Accuracy Consensus
Dis-Adam 0 96.2%
√
Local Adam N/A 92.3% N/A
Dis-Adam 1 10.3% ×
BRIDGE 1 95.8%
√
great interest in real-world applications.
6 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a new decentralized machine learning algorithm called Byzantine resilient decen-
tralized gradient descent. This algorithm is designed to solve machine learning problems when the training
set is distributed over a network in the presence of Byzantine failures. Theoretical analysis and numerical
results have been given to show that the algorithm can learn good models while being able to tolerate a
certain number of Byzantine nodes in the network. This is in contrast to the fact that classic distributed
learning algorithms fail under Byzantine failure.
A Proof of Lemma 1
First we observe at some dimension k,
E[g2(t)]k = E
|J ′|∑
i=1
[αk(t)]i[∇fi(v(t))]k = E[∇f(v(t))]k . (30)
Since k is arbitrarily picked, it is also true that
E[g2(t)] = E[∇f(v(t))] (31)
Note that v(t) depends on t and αk(t) depends on both t and k. We need to show that the convergence is
simultaneously true for all v(t) and αk(t). We fix one coordinate k and drop the index k for simplicity. We
define a vector h(t) as h(t) := [∇fj(v(t)) : j ∈ J ′]. Then g2(t) = 〈α(t),h(t)〉. We know from Hoeffding’s
inequality [47]:
P
( |〈α(t),h(t)〉 − E[∇f(v(t))]| ≥ ǫ) ≤ 2 exp(− 2Nǫ2
L2‖α(t)‖2
)
(32)
Further, since the |J ′|-dimensional vector α(t) is an arbitrary element of the standard simplex, defined
as
∆ := {q ∈ R|J ′| :
|J ′|∑
j=1
[q]j = 1 and ∀j, [q]j ≥ 0}, (33)
the probability bound in (32) also holds for any u ∈ ∆, i.e.,
P (|〈q,h(t)〉 − E[∇f(v(t))]| ≥ ǫ) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2Nǫ
2
L2‖q‖2
)
. (34)
We now define the set Sα := {αk(t)}∞,dt,k=1. Our next goal is to leverage (34) and derive a probability
bound similar to (32) that uniformly holds for all q ∈ Sα. To this end, let
Cξ := {c1, . . . , cdξ} ⊂ ∆ s.t. Sα ⊆
dξ⋃
q=1
B(cq , ξ) (35)
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denote an ξ-covering of Sα in terms of the ℓ2 norm and define c¯ := argmaxc∈Cξ ‖c‖. It then follows from (34)
and the union bound that
P
(
sup
c∈Cξ
|〈c,h(t)〉 − E[∇f(v(t))]| ≥ ǫ
)
≤ 2dξ exp
(
− 2Nǫ
2
L2‖c¯‖2
)
. (36)
In addition, we have
sup
q∈Sα
|〈q,h(t)〉 − E[∇f(v(t))]|
(a)
≤ sup
c∈Cξ
|〈c,h(t)〉 − E[∇f(v(t))]| + sup
q∈Sα,c∈Cξ
‖q− c‖‖h(t)‖, (37)
where (a) is due to triangle and Cauchy–Schwarz inequalities. Trivially, sup
q∈Sα,c∈Cξ ‖q− c‖ ≤ ξ from the
definition of Cξ, while ‖h(t)‖ ≤
√|J ′|L from the definition of h(t) and Assumption 3. Combining (36) and
(37), we get
P
(
sup
q∈Sα
|〈q,h(t)〉 − E[∇f(v(t))]| ≥ ǫ+
√
|J ′|ξL
)
≤ 2dξ exp
(
− 2Nǫ
2
L2‖c¯‖2
)
. (38)
We now define α¯ := argmax
q∈Sα ‖q‖. It can then be shown from the definitions of Cξ and c¯ that
‖c¯‖2 ≤ 2(‖α¯‖2 + ξ2). (39)
Therefore, picking any ǫ′ > 0, and defining ǫ := ǫ′/2 and ξ := ǫ′/(2L
√|J ′|), we have from (38) and (39) that
P
(
sup
q∈Sα
|〈q,h(t)〉 − E[∇f(v(t))]| ≥ ǫ′
)
≤ 2dξ exp
(
− 4|J
′|Nǫ′2
4L2|J ′|‖α¯‖2 + ǫ′2
)
. (40)
Note that (40) is derived for one dimension. We then have for all dimensions that fixing any v(t),
P
(
‖g2(t)− E[∇f(v(t))]‖ ≥
√
dǫ′
)
≤ 2dξ exp
(
− 4|J
′|Nǫ′2
4L2|J ′|‖α¯‖2 + ǫ′2
)
. (41)
In order to obtain the desired uniform bound, we next need to remove the dependence on v(t) in (41).
Here we write g2(t) as g2(v(t)) to show the dependency of g2 on v(t). We first claim that v(t) ∈ W :=
{v : ‖v‖∞ ≤ Γ} for some Γ and all t. We will verify this claim at the end of Appendix B. We then define
Eζ := {e1, . . . , emζ} ⊂W to be a ζ-covering of W in terms of the ℓ2 norm. It then follows from (41) that
P
(
sup
e∈Eζ
‖g2(e)− E[∇f(e)]‖ ≥
√
dǫ′
)
≤ 2dξmζ exp
(
− 4|J
′|Nǫ′2
4L2|J ′|‖α¯‖2 + ǫ′2
)
. (42)
Similar to (37),we can also write
sup
v∈W
‖g2(v) − E[∇f(v)]| ≤ sup
e∈Eζ
‖g2(e)− E[∇f(e)]‖
+ sup
e∈Eζ ,v∈W
[
‖g2(v) − g2(e)‖+ ‖E[∇f(e)]− E[∇f(v)]‖
]
. (43)
Further, we have from Assumption 3 and definition of the set Eζ that
sup
e,v
‖g2(v) − g2(e)‖ ≤ L′ζ, and (44)
sup
e,v
‖E[∇f(e)]− E[∇f(v)]| ≤ L′ζ. (45)
We now fix ǫ′′ > 0, and define ǫ′ := ǫ′′/2
√
d and ζ := ǫ′′/4L′. We then obtain the following from (41)–(45):
P
(
sup
v∈W
|g2(v) − E[∇f(v)]| ≥ ǫ′′
)
≤ 2dξmζ exp
(
− 4|J
′|Nǫ′′2
16L2|J ′|d‖α¯‖2 + ǫ′′2
)
. (46)
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Since v(t) ∈W for all t, we then have
P
(
sup
t
|g2(v(t)) − E[∇f(v(t))]| ≥ ǫ′′
)
≤ 2dξmζ exp
(
− 4|J
′|Nǫ′′2
16L2|J ′|d‖α¯‖2 + ǫ′′2
)
. (47)
The proof now follows from (47) and the following facts about the covering numbers of the sets Sα and
W: (1) Since Sα is a subset of ∆, which can be circumscribed by a sphere in R|J ′|−1 of radius
√
|J ′|−1
|J ′| < 1,
we can upper bound dξ by
(
12L
√
|J ′|d
ǫ′′
)|J ′|
[48]; and (2) Since W ⊂ Rd can be circumscribed by a sphere in
Rd of radius Γ
√
d, we can upper bound mζ by
(
12L′Γ
√
d
ǫ′′
)d
. We then conclude that
sup
t
|g2(v(t)) − E[∇f(v(t))]| < ǫ′′ (48)
with probability exceeding
1− 2 exp
(
− 4|J
′|Nǫ′′2
16L2|J ′|d‖α¯‖2 + ǫ′′2 + |J
′| log
(
12L
√|J ′|d
ǫ′′
)
+ P log
(
12L′Γ
√
d
ǫ′′
))
. (49)
Equivalently, by ignoring the log terms, we have with probability at least 1− δ,
sup
t
|g2(v(t)) − E[∇f(v(t))]| < O
√4L2d‖α¯‖2 log 2δ
N
 (50)
B Proof of Theorem 1
We define f¯(v(t)) := E[f(v(t)] and establish f¯(v(t))
t,N−−→ f¯(w∗) in probability. It then follows from [49,
Theorem 4.4] and our assumptions that w∗ is a strong minimizer of f¯(·) and, therefore, v(t) t,N−−→ w∗ in
probability.
In order to prove the aforementioned claim, we fix any ǫ > 0 and show that f¯(v(t)) − f¯(w∗) ≤ ǫ for
all large enough t with probability that approaches 1 as N → ∞. To this end, we claim that f¯(v(t)) for
all t greater than some t′ ∈ N is a strictly monotonically decreasing function with probability 1 as long as
‖∇f¯(v(t))‖ > ǫ∇ for ǫ∇ := ǫ3Γ . This claim means that ‖∇f¯(v(t))‖ eventually becomes smaller than ǫ∇ with
probability 1 for large enough t, which implies
f¯(v(t)) − f¯(w∗) ≤ −〈∇f¯(v(t)), (w∗ − v(t))〉
≤ ‖∇f¯(v(t))‖(‖w∗‖2 + ‖v(t)‖)
≤ 2ǫ∇Γ < ǫ (51)
because of convexity of f¯(·), the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, and our assumptions. Since this is the desired
result, we need only focus on the claim of strict monotonicity of f¯(v(t)) for this lemma. To prove this claim,
note from Assumption 3 that
f¯(v(t + 1)) ≤ f¯(v(t)) + 〈∇f¯(v(t)), (v(t + 1)− v(t))〉 + L
2
‖v(t+ 1)− v(t)‖2. (52)
Next, we can write the update of v(t) as follows:
v(t+ 1) = v(t)− ρ(t)g2(t) + d(t).
where d(t) = ρ(t)g1(t)− ρ(t)g2(t). Plugging this into (52) results in
f¯(v(t)) − f¯(v(t + 1)) ≥ −〈∇f¯(v(t)),d(t)〉 + ρ(t)〈g2(t),∇f¯ (v(t))〉 − L
2
‖d(t)− ρ(t)g2(t)‖2. (53)
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The right-hand side of (53) strictly lower bounded by 0 implies strict monotonicity of f¯(v(t)). Simple
algebraic manipulations show that this is equivalent to the condition
Lρ(t)2
2
‖g2(t)‖2 < −〈∇f¯(v(t)),d(t)〉 + ρ(t)〈g2(t),∇f¯(v(t))〉 + Lρ(t)〈d(t),g2(t)〉 − L
2
‖d(t)‖2. (54)
Next, from Lemma 1 that P(‖g2(t) − ∇f¯(v(t))‖ ≤ ǫ′) converges to 1 simultaneously for all t for any
ǫ′ > 0. We therefore have with probability 1 (as N →∞) that
‖g2(t)‖2 ≤ ‖∇f¯(v(t))‖2 + ǫ′2 + 2ǫ′‖[∇f¯(v(t))‖ (55)
and
〈g2(t),∇f¯(v(t))〉 ≥ ‖∇f¯(v(t))‖2 − ǫ′‖∇f¯(v(t))‖. (56)
The inequalities (55) and (56) make the following condition sufficient for (54) to hold with high probability:
Lρ(t)2
2
‖∇f¯(v(t))‖2 + Lρ(t)
2
2
ǫ′2 + Lρ(t)2ǫ′‖∇f¯(v(t))‖ < ρ(t)‖∇f¯(v(t))‖2 − ρ(t)ǫ′‖∇f¯(v(t))‖
+Lρ(t)〈d(t),g2(t)〉 − 〈∇f¯(v(t)),d(t)〉 − L
2
‖d(t)‖2. (57)
Noting that Lρ(t)
2
2 − ρ(t) < 0, we can rewrite (57) as
‖∇f¯(v(t))‖ >
(
2ǫ′‖∇f¯(v(t))‖
2− Lρ(t) +
2〈∇f¯(v(t)),d(t)〉
2ρ(t)− Lρ(t)2 −
2L〈d(t),g2(t)〉
2− Lρ(t)
+
L‖d(t)‖2
2ρ(t)− Lρ(t)2 +
2Lρ(t)ǫ′‖∇f¯(v(t))‖
2− Lρ(t) +
Lρ(t)ǫ′2
2− Lρ(t)
) 1
2
. (58)
Condition (58) is sufficient for (54) to hold in probability. We now note that ‖∇f¯(·)‖ and ‖g2(·)‖ in (58)
can be upper bounded by some constants L∇¯ and L∇ by virtue of Assumption 3 and the definition of W.
Together with Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, we have the following sufficient condition for (54):
‖∇f¯(v(t))‖ >
(
2L∇¯ǫ′ + 2LL∇¯ρ(t)ǫ′ + Lρ(t)ǫ′2
2− Lρ(t) +
2LL∇‖d(t)‖
2− Lρ(t) +
2L∇¯‖d(t)‖+ L‖d(t)‖2
2ρ(t)− Lρ(t)2
) 1
2
. (59)
The right-hand side of (59) can be made arbitrarily small (and, in particular, equal to ǫ∇) through appro-
priate choice of ǫ′ and large enough t; indeed, we have from our assumptions, Lemma 1, and the definitions
of ρ(t) and d(t) that both d(t) and d(t)/ρ(t) converge to 0 as t→∞.
This completes the proof, except that we need to validate one remaining claim. The claim is that f¯(v(t))
cannot converge when ‖∇f¯(v(t))‖ > ǫ∇. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose ∃ǫ0 > 0 such that
‖∇f¯(v(t))‖ − ǫ∇ > ǫ0 for all t. We know ∃t′ ∈ N such that the right hand side of (59) becomes smaller than
ǫ∇ for all t ≥ t′. Therefore, adding ǫ0 to the right hand side of (59) and combining with (53) gives ∀t ≥ t′:
f¯(v(t)) − f¯(v(t + 1)) ≥ (2ρ(t)− Lρ(t)2)(ǫ20 + 2ǫ∇ǫ0). (60)
Taking summation on both sides of (60) from t = t′ to∞, and noting that∑∞t=t′ ρ(t) =∞ and∑∞t=t′ ρ(t)2 <
∞, gives us f¯(v(t′)) − limt→∞ f¯(v(t)) ≥ ∞. This contradicts the fact that f¯(·) is lower bounded, thereby
validating our claim.
Now we take advantage of the monotone result to prove the claim we made earlier that v(t) ∈ W
for all t. Since (59) can be satisfied after some t′, we define a constant C0 = max
t≤t′
f¯(v(t)) and a set
W0 := {v : f¯(v) ≤ C0}. Then define a set W := {v : ‖v‖∞ ≤ Γ} where we can always find a Γ satisfying
W0 ⊂ W. We then show that v(t) ∈ W for all t. It follows trivially that v(t) ∈ W0 ⊂ W for t ≤ t′. Since
(59) is satisfied and v(t′) ∈ W, with probability 1, f¯(v(t′ + 1)) < f¯(v(t′)). Thus, v(t′ + 1) ∈ W. Then the
claim can be proven by induction.
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